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remarks from so high a source were
well calculated to mislead them as
to the proper grounds and consider-
ation upon which they should found
their verdict, and settle the rights
of the parties. The danger that
such would be the effect, whether it
was so or not, would be ;ufficient to
vitiate the verdict. . . . Jurors
should be left to the free and fair
exercise of their judgments, and
not subjected to threat or coercion
to induce 'them to surrender their
honest judgments."
The reader is referred to "Mis-
conduct of the jury as ground for a
new trial," in the July number of
this RBviw.
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Words, Creating a Conversion of Real Property into .Prsozalty,
ht a Will.
A will authorizing the trustees thereunder-to sell any of the-property
and directing them to invest the proceeds "so as to he safe.and produce
income," and pay the income to the testator's wife and children for their
lives, remainder over, does not mean that the unproductive real estate of
the testator shall be treated as converted as ofrthe .day of his death, so
that only such portion- of the purchase-money would he principal as with
interest from the testator's death to the day of sale, would equal the
entire amount realized, and that the balance should be distributed-as
income, but the entire amount must be treated as principal.
EQUITABI,E CONVCRSION.
By equitable conversion is meant
a change in the nature of property
from real into personal, or from
personal into real, for certain pur-
poses of devolution, not actually
taking place but presumed to exist
only by construction or intend-
ment of equity: Bispham's Equity,
5th ed., 307.
The whole doctrine of equitable
conversion depends upon the well-
established and familiar principle
that a court of equity looks upon
20 S. W., 778-
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that as done which a testator by his
will hasdirected to becdone, so faras
the will of the decedent could have
been carried into effect without
violating any rule of law or equit-
able principle: Lorillard v. Coster,
5 Paige, 173; Emerson v. Cutler,
14 Pick., 120.
Conversion may be effected in
two ways: First, by a trust under
a will; and second, by a contract
between parties both living.
As a general rule, in the first
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case, the trust must be couched in
imperative language, and in the
second the contract must be bind-
ing.
The conversion in the first in-
stance takes place from the death
of the testator, as that is the time
when the will takes effect, and in
the second instance, from the de-
livery of the papers forming the
settlement or contract: Van Vech-
ten v. Van Vechten, 8 Paige, io6;
McClure's App., 72 Pa., 414; Loftis
'v. Glass, 15 Ark., 68o: McWilliam's
App., 9 Cent. Rep., 773; Arnold v.
.Gilbert, 5 Barbours S. Ct., 192.
It is only the first of these two
methods of working a conversion
with which we have to deal at
present-that is conversion arising
under a trust in a will.
By the use of certain words of
direction a testator makes it im-
perative upon his executors or
trustees to convert his estate into
that species of property in which
he wishes to give it to his bene-
ficiaries. It is this duty, imposed
upon the executors or trustees,
which a court of equity considers
as performed, even before actual
conversion has been made, and in
order that the rights of parties in
interest may not be prejudiced by
delay on the part of the executors
or trustees. In carrying out the
direction of the testator, the con-
version directed to be made is con-
sidered as effected as of the date of
the testator's death: Craig v. Leslie,
3 Wheat., 563; Holland v. Cruft, 3
Gray, i8o; Kane v. Gott, 24 Wend.,
641; Greenland v. Waddell, i6
N. Y., 234; Allison v. Wilson, 13
S. & R., 330; Collins v. Champ's
Heirs, 15B. Mon. (Ky.), X 18; Green
v'. Johnson, 4 Bush., 167.
As a delay on the part of the
executors will not prevent a con-
version from taking place, so a
direction in the will postponing
the time of sale will not have that
effect: Hocker v. Gentry, 3 Metc.
(Ky.), 463; High v. Worley, 33
Ala., 196.
There are several well-recognized
ways in which conversion may be
worked by a testator: First, by an
express, imperative direction to
execut'ors or trustees to sell ltnd
and distribute the proceeds, or to
lay out a fund in land for a devisee;
second, by applying to one kind of
property limitations applicable to
it only in its changed form; and,
third, by a blending of real and
personal property in such a way-
that distribution can onlybe effected
by a sale of one kind of property
or the other.
The leading English authority on
the subject of equitable conversion
is Bletcher v. Ashburner, i Bro.
C. C., 491. The testator devised
real estate to trustees in trust
(after his widow's death) to sell the
same and divide the proceeds be-
tween his son and daughter. No-
thing could be more clear and
imperative than such a direction.
The testator's intention, which is
the touchstone by which the ques-
tion of conversion or no conver-
sion, and indeed most other ques-
tions relating to the interpretation
of wills are decided, is here ap-
parent, to wit: that the land
should be sold and the proceeds
divided.
The question before the court
arose in this way: The son and
daughter, the legatees under their
father's will, both died in the life-
time of their mother, until whose
death conversion in fact could not
take place, and so'at the time of
her death the land was still in fact
land, and as such it was claimed by
the son's heir-at-law. The personal
representatives of the widow
EQUITABLE CONVERSION.
claimed it as personalty, and Sir
THOMAS SZWJrLL, M. R., decided
in their favor, saying: "Nothing
is better established than the prin-
ciple that money directed to be
employed in the purchase of land
and land directed to be sold and
turned into money are to be con-
sidered as that species of property
into which they are directed to be
converted. The cases establish this
rule universally."
In the old case of Doughty v.
Bull, 2 P. Win., 320, Lord Chancel-
lor KING held that a direction to
trustees to sell land and distribute
the proceeds, the time of sale being
left to the discretion of the trus-
tees, would work a conversion.
The Lord Chancellor says: "The
rule being that lands devised to be
sold are thereby made personal
estate, this case is within such rule,
the lands.are here devised to be
sold and only the time of sale left
discretionary."
If the direction to sell be im-
perative a long delay in the sale
will not prevent a conversion:
Yates v. Compton, 3 P. Win., 3o8,
was a case of a devise of land to
executors to sell and pay an an-
nuity. There was a long delay in
the sale and, the annuitant dying
bef6re it was made, the heir claimed
the land. The Lord Chancellor
decided that the clearly expressed
intention of the will was to give
away all from the heir, to turn the
land in question into personal es-
tate, and this must be taken as if it
was at the time of the death of the
testator, and ought not te be altered
by any subsequent accident.
In 1838 Lord LANGDALE, M. R.,
held the following will to have
worked a conversion out and out:
"I do empower my wife to sell all
my real estate whatsoever and the
money arising from such sale,
together with my personal estate,
she, my said wife, shall and may
divide and proportion among my
said children as she shall by will
direct." The widow died without
having sold or apportioned the
estate. The power to sell was con-
strued as in the nature of a trust
for the children, and subject to
such apportionment as the widow
might make, the children were en-
titled in equal shares to the con-
verted real estate: Grieveson v.
Kirsopp, 2 Keen, 653.
The provisions in the wills coi-
sidered in the cases of in re Ibbit-
son, L. R. 7 Eq., 226, De Beauvoir
v. De Beauvoir, 3 H. L. Cas., 548,
were held not to be couched in
sufficiently imperative language to
effect a conversion, though in the
latter case the intention of the tes-
tator was to make his real and per-
sonal property blend and to give
the combined fund the character of
real property: See Atwell v. Atwell,
L. R. 13 Eq., 23.
Ix the case of Curling v. May,
cite 1 3 Atk., 255, A gave ,C5oo to
B in trust, that B should lay out
the same upon a purchase of lands
or put the same out on good securi-
ties, for the separate use of his
daughter, H (the plaintifPs then
wife), her heirs, etc., and died 1729.
In 1731 H, the daughter, died with-
out issue, before the money was
invested in a purchase. The hus-
band, as administrator, brought a
bill for the money against the heir
of H, and the money was decreed
to the administrator; for the wife,
not having signified any intention
of a preference, the court would
take it as it was found. If the wife
had signified any intention it
should have been observed, but it
was not reasonable at that time to
give either her heir or the adminis-
trator or the trustee liberty to elect.
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.Lord TALBOT said: "It was orig-
inally personal estate, and yet re-
mained so, and by reason of the
alternative language of the will
nothing could be gathered from it
as to what was the testator's prin-
cipal intention."
Where the direction was to pur-
chase land or other securities, and
this was followed by the limitation
to trustees in trust for the wife for
life, and after her decease to such
uses and under such provisions,
conditions and limitations as his
lands before devised were limited,
Lord HARDWICKu decided that
-conversion of the above fund was
not at the election of. the trustees.
It was the evident intention of the
testator that the money should be
laid out in land, and the discretion
must be taken to mean only that,
till lands are purchased, the trustees
might invest the money in personal
securities: Earlom v. Saunders,
Amb., 241.
Had there been no clause show-
ing conclusively the testator's in-
tention to convert, the alternative
character of this direction would
have prevented a conversion from
being effected.
In Bleight v. the Bank, io Pa.,
131, a conveyance to trustees to
pay an annuity out of the rents
of certain real estate or to sell
was held not to make a con-
version because it was not impera-
tive on the trustees to exercise the
power. Where a discretion whether
to sell or not is vested in any ex-
ecutor or devisee conversion does
not take place.
Mr. Justice THoMPsoN says in
Anewalt's App., 42 Pa., 414: "To
establish a conversion the will
must direct it out and out, irre-
spective of all contingencies. The
direction to convert must be posi-
tive and explicit and the will must
decisively fix upon the land the
quality of money. The sale directed
in this case depended upon several
contingencies. It was made de-
pendent upon the acceptance or
non-acceptauce of the land on cer-
tain terms by his sons. See also
Nagle's App., 13 Pa., 260, and
Stoner v. Zimmerman, 22 Pa., 894.
In Foster's App., 74 Pa., 391, a
question as to the conversion of
partnership land arose, and Judge
SnrARSWOOD said, delivering the
opinion of the court: "Conversion
is altogether a doctrine of equity.
In law it has no being. It is ad-
mitted only for the accomplish-'
ment of equitable results. It may
be termed an equitable fiction, and
the legal maxim in fictione juris
sexper subsisil equitas has re-
doubled force in application to it.
It follows, of necessity, that it is
limited to its end. When the pur-
pose of conversion is attained con-
version ends, or, more accurately,
reconversion takes place."
Where the conversion directed
to be made is only for certain pur-
poses, those purposes failing the
conversion does not take place, but
it is sometimes a difficult question
whether the intention of the tes-
tator is to convert only for the pur-
poses of the will or out and out for
all purposes. This can only be
determined by a consideration of
the entire will.
In Page's Estate, 75 Pa., 87, the
entire estate was vested in trustees,
the personalty to be held upon cer-
tain trusts, and the executors, in
the fourth item of the will were
clothed with a discretionary power
to sell any part of the real estate,
the proceeds of such sales to be held
upon the same trust. It was held
that although conversion may arise
without express terms, where it is
clear that the testator meant to
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create a fund out of both real and
personal estate, and bequeathed it
as money, yet as the whole frame
of the will in this case indicated
no more than a mere discretionary
power to sell any part of the real
estate, no conversion, was worked.
These words, "Lastly, it is my
will, that, after the death of my
beloved wife, all my estate be ap-
praised and sold as soon as it can
be done with advantage; and if
any of my sons think proper to
take the farm on which I now live,
at the appraisement, he shall have
the privilege of doing so on paying
the other heirs their respective
shares; and it is my will that. all
the money arising from the sale of
my real estate be equally divided
among all my children share and
share alike," were held an express
direction to sell, and the fact that
the will further permitted one of
the sons at his option to take the
farm at the valuation to be made,
did .not change the effect of the
direction to sell. Whether or not
a son acquired the farm, it was
nevertheless a sale, and the one
taking it became a purchaser:
Laird's App., 85 Pa., 339,
The probable Pennsylvania rule
on this doctrine is found in Jones
v. Caldwell, 97 Pa., 42, where Mr.
Justice PAxsox delivering the opin-
ion of the court, says: "An abso-
lute direction to sell lands after the
death of the testator's widow, and
to divide the proceeds among his
children, effects an equitable con-
version thereof into personalty."
The testator in this case left the
income of his real estate to his wife,
so long as she remained his widow,
and after her death he directed his
executors to dispose of all his prop-
erty real, personal and mixed, and
he goes on to say that if his heirs
agree to a division of the estate
amongst themselves, the executors
are not to be bound to make the
sale. This subsequent provision
does not prevent a conversion, be-
cause it is surplusage and may be
stricken from the will without alter-
ing its legal effect. The law gives
the heirs the right to elect to take
the property as real estate. The
testator must have intended a con-
version even in the event of a divi-
sion of the estate among the heiis
by agreement. There were eight
heirs, and but five separate prop-
erties of unequal values. Be that
as it may, to have divided them
would have required either a sale
between themselves or partition
according to law. The latter wofild
have necessarily involved an ap-
praisement .and sale, and hence a
conversion.
The fact that one of several bene-
ficiaries may be given an option to
take the property -in its uncon-
verted state does not prevent a con-
version from taking place: Laird's
App., 85 Pa., 339; Pyle's App.,
102 Pa., 317 ; Miller v. Common-
wealth, iii Pa., 321.
In number one hundred of the
Pennsylvania State Reports are
found two cases which treat the
subject of conversion rather fully.
The irst is Roland v. Miller, at
page 47, in which a, testatrix di-
rected that all her personal estate
should be equally divided among
her children and heirs at law.
Further on in the will she made
the same disposition of the pro-
ceeds from any sale of her real
estate. The executors were not to
be compelled by her heirs to sell
any real estate until the expiration
of the term for which such real
estate might be leased. She pro-
hibited the sale of any real estate
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for ten years after her decease, un-
less her executors should deem it
advantageous or advisable to sell
the whole or any part, in which
case they were authorized and em-
powered to do so within the term
of ten years. TRUNxuY, J., says:
"It never is presumed that a testa-
tor intended to die intestate as to
any part of his estate if a contrary
intent can be fairly deduced from
the language of his will. The nat-
ural and reasonable intendment of
this will is, that the realty shall be
sold and the proceeds divided
among the legatees. Within a
limited time the executors have
unlimited discretionary power to
sell, after that time they are bound
to-sell. A provision that the execu-
tors shall not be compelled to sell,
by the heirs, until the expiration
of a stipulated term, implies that
then they may be compelled. The
power vested in the executors, dis-
cretionary for a certain time, there-
after is unconditional, notdepend-
ent on discretion or contingency,
nor upon the consent or agreement
of any person, and if they neglect
or refuse to exercise it, they may
be compelled to perform their duty
by legal process at the instance of
any legatee."
The other case in this same vol-
ume of reports is Bright's App.,
ioo Pa., 602. Here the testator
directed all his real estate to be
sold for the payment of debts and
legacies; some of it he directed
should be sold immediately. So
much of it as was not necessary for
the payment of debts he directed
should not be sold till the first day
of April, I866. Mr. Justice PAX-
SON says : " That the real estate
was converted by the will is too
plain for argument. Here was an
express direction to sell, and divide
the proceeds among nieces and
nephews. It depended upon no
contingencies except time, than
which there is nothing more cer-
tain."
Where land is devised to execu-
tors with a direction to sell, the
legal title thereto vests in them,
but by some decisive act on .he
part of the heirs or beneficiaries it
is possible for them to divest the
legal title, and take the land in
lieu of money: Anderson v. An-
derson, 133 Pa., 408.
A will containing this clause,
"I give to my executors power to
sell and dispose of the whole or'
any portion of my real estate or
personal property, if they find it
necessary to do so in order to make
a fair and equitable division of n4y
estate," was held not to work an
equitable conversion: Sheridan u.
Sheridan, 136 Pa., 14.
Mr. Justice Wnrf, mJs in the
above case said: "The will gives a
power of sale, but leaves the ques-
tion whether it shall be exercised'
or not to the discretion of the ex-
ecutors. The reason why a power
of sale works a constructive con-
version is only that it makes an
actual conversion certain, which is
not the case where discretion to
use the power or not is left to the
executors. The estate is treated at
once as havingthe qualities it must-
necessarily have where the power
is exercised."
A testator bequeathed all his
estate to his wife, for her use, as
long as she remained his widow.
If she desired the land to be sold,
the executor was to sell it, the pro-
ceeds to be invested for her use for
life, or as long as she remained his
widow. Held not to work a con-
version, as the direction was not
positive and explicit, and the will
EQUITABLE CONVERSION.
did not decisively fix upon the
land the quality of money: Mach-
emer's F state, 140 Pa., 544.
In Hunter v. Anderson, 152 Pa.,
386, an agreement that a trustee
shall sell certain land and dis-
tribute the proceeds was considered
as having worked a conversion, and
the purchaser from the trustee took
the land free from liens against the
cestuis gue trust and unaffected by
the dower of their wives.
The case of Pahnestock v. Fah-
nestock, 152 Pa., 56, is a good
illustration of an equitable conver-
sion effected, not by an express
direction to sell, but by a power of
sale given to executors, and the
impossibility of otherwise carrying
out the clearly expressed intention
of the testator in his will. Mr.
Justice McCuLLom said : "It is not
contended that the words, 'I here-
by empower and authorize my ex-
ecutors to sell all my real and per-
sonal property, at private or public
sale, and make and execute deeds
in fee simple for my real estate,'
standing alone, operate as a con-
version, but it was thought by the
learned judge below, and it is in-
sisted upon by the appellees here,
that these words taken in connec-
tion with the other provisions of
the will, exhibit a clear intention
and purpose on the part of the tes-
tator that his real and personal
property shall be converted into
money for investment, and the col-
lecion and disbursement of inter-
est or income in accordance with
his directions therein, and further,
that it is not possible to execute
the will according to its terms
without such a conversion of his
real estate.
A mere naked power to sell real
estate does not operate as a con-
version of it into personalty, but
such p-,wer coupled with a di-
rection or command to sell will
have that effect. If a testator
authorizes his executors to sell his
real estate, and to execute and de-
liver to the purchasers deeds in fee
simple of the same, as in this case,
and it is clear from the face of his
will. that it was his intention the
power so conferred by him should
be exercised, it will be construed
as a direction to sell, and will op-
erate as an equitable conversion.
If in addition to the clear inten-
tion of the testator, it plainly ap-
pears that effect cannot be given to
material provisions of the will
without the exercise of the power,
the conclusion is irresistible that
a conversion is as effectually ac-
complished by the will, and the
duties of the executor under it are
the same, as if it contained a posi-
tive direction to sell.
There can be no final settle-
ment of the estate, in accordance,
with the will, until the power
conferred upon the executor for
the sale of the real and personal
property is exercised, therefore,
conversion in fact must take place,
and in point of equity the estate
is considered as converted from
the time of the death of the tes-
tator.
In the Supreme Court of the
United States Craig v. Leslie is the
leading case, decided in 1818 and
reported in 3 Wheaton, 564. The
direction in the will was as follows :
" I give my real and personal es-
tate to five executors, upon special
trust, that my executors will sell
both my personal and real estate.
I give and bequeath to my brother
all the proceeds of my estate, both
real and personal, which I have
herein directed to be sold, to be re-
mitted unto him." The brother of
the testator was an alien, and as
such could not take land. The in-
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tention of the testator was clearly
to convert his real estate into per-
sonalty, in order that the brother
might take the bequest of the pro-
ceeds, and this intention was car-
ried out.
WASHINGTON, J., delivering the
opinion of the court, after review-
ing the English authorities, says:
" Were this a new question it
would seem extremely difficult to
raise a doubt respecting it The
common sense of mankind would
determine that a devise of money,
the proceeds of'lands directed to
be sold, is a devise of money, not-
withstanding it is to arise out of
land; and that a devise of land,
which a testator directs by his will
to be purchased, will pass an inter-'
est in the land itself, without re-
gard to the character of the fund
out of which the purchase is to be
made.
"The settled doctrine of the
courts of equity corresponds with
this obvious construction of wills,
as well as of other instruments,
whereby land is directed to be
turned into money, or money into
land, for the benefit of those for
,whose use the conversion is in-
tended to'be made."
In Peter v. Beverly, io Peters,
532, .the testator directed certain
land to be sold for the payment of
debts, and did not say who was to
sell. It was held, that the neces-
sary implication was that the ex-
ecutors were to carry out the direc-
tion. Craig v. Leslie (suPra) is
quoted, and the doctrine therein
stated adopted.
Taylor v. Benham, 5 How., 233,
was a case in which the following
clause was construed to have
worked a conversion: "I do here-
by order, will and direct, that, on
the first day of January next, after
my decease, or as near that day a.
can conveniently be, the whole of
the property that I may die seized
or possessed of, or may be in any-
wise belonging to me, be sold."
WOODBERRY, J., says: "Courts in
carrying out the wishes of testators,
the pole star in wills, are much in-
clined, especially in equity, to
vest all the powers or interest in
executors which are necessary to
effectuate those wishes, if the
language can fairly admit it. They
are inclined, also, when consider-
ing it a trust, or a power coupled
with an interest, to have its dura-
tion and quantity commensurate
with the object tobe accomplished:
Bradstreet v. Clarke, 12 Wend.,
663; Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend.,
299. The whole of this doctrine
proceeds upon a principle which is
incontrovertible, that where the
testator merely directs the real
estate to be converted for the pur-
poses of the will, so much of his
estate, or the money arising from
it, as it not effectually disposed of
by the will (whether it arises from
some omission or defect in the
will itself, or from any subsequent
accident which may prevent the
devise from taking effect) results
to the heir-at-law: Burr v. Sire, i
Wharton, 252. See Cropley v.
Cooper, 19 Wall., i67. .
In New York the doctrine of
equitable conversion has been
adopted in toto, and the rules for
determining whether or not con-
version in a specified case is to be
considered as having taken place
are much the same as those applic-
able in the same case in an Eng-
lish court.
The intention of the testator, if
sufficiently clearly expressed, gov-
erns in this matter; when once
that intention is determined, as
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well as in all other questions con-
cerning the construiction and in-
terpretation of wills. There must
be either an express, imperative
direction to the executor or trustee
to sell, or a power of sale given, in
connection with a limitation ap-
plicable to the property only in a
changed form from that in which
it is at the time of the testator's
death, or by a blending by the
testator of his real and personal
estate, making it distributable as
personalty.
In the case of, In the Matter of
Gansert, 136 N. Y., ro6, there was
a direction to executors to pay
debts of decedent and certain
legacies. This was followed by a
clause in the following words:
"Giving and granting unto my
said executors and trustees full
power and authority to sell and
convey any and all my real estate,
either at private sale or public auc-
tion, and to make, execute and de-
liver good and sufficient convey-
ances therefore."
MA NARD, J., says: "The tes-
tator well knew that his debts
could not be paid, as directed,
without sale of real estate, and he
intended to clothe his executors
with a power commensurate with
the duties and obligations laid
upon them.
Whenever a power or authority
to sell is given without limitation,
and is not in terms made discre-
tionary, and its exercise is ren-
dered necessary by the scope o
the will and its declared purposes,
the authority is to be deemed im-
perative, and a direction to sell
will be implied, provided the de-
sign and purpose of the testator is
unequivocal, and the implication
so strong as to leave no substantial
doubt, and his intention cannot
otherwise be carried out: Scholle
v. Scholle, 113 N. Y., 261; Cham-
berlain v. Taylor, io5 N. Y., 194;
Hobson v. Hale, 95 N. Y., 593.
The real and personal estate if
blended in one gift to the executors
for a common trust, in which all
the beneficiaries share equally. In
such -cases the exercise of a gen-
eral and unlimited power of sale is
imperative, and riay be compelled
in favor of any party who is law-
fully entitled under the provisions
of the will to the real property,
when sold.
In the case of Clift v. Moses ii6
N. Y., 144, the following power
given to an executor was held not
to work a conversion as a sale was
not absolutely necessary for the
purposes of the will: "I give and
devise to my executor and ex-
ecutrix all my real and property of
every kind in trust for the purpose
of paying my debts and legacies
named in this, my last will, giving
them power to sell, mortgage and
convey any and all real estate for
the purposes above named."
HAIGHT, J., ilelivering the opin-
ion of the court, said: "Conversion
arises only from an express, clear,
and imperative direction, or from
a necessary implication of such: 6
Am. and Bng. Encyclopedia of
Law, 665. The question of conver-
sion is one of intention, and the
question is did the testator intend
to have his real estate converted
into personalty immediately upon
his death? The whole will, and
the circumstances of each case
must be considered in deciding this
question. If he did so intend, the
court must give this intention ef-
fect, and treat the realty as per-
sonalty from the time of his death.
If, however, he intended to give the
executor, or trustee under his will,
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a power to convert, leaving it dis-
cretionary with them to convert or
not, the conversion will depend
upon the will or discretion of the
executor or trustee, and will not
be regarded as consummated in
law, until it id consummated in
fact. In the will under considera-
tion a power to sell, mortgage or
convey any or all of the real estate
is given. It is left entirely discre-
tionary with the executor ortrustee
whether the sale shall be made or
not; and as to whether the whole,
or a portion only, shall be sold. It
follows that there was no conver-
sion until the executor exercised
the power and consummated the
sale:" Henderson v. Henderson,21
N. Y., 8oo; Parker v. Liiden, 22
N. Y., 614.
]vidently the distinction be-
tween Clift v. Moses, and In re
Gansert, is to be found in the cir-
cumstances of each estate-in Clift
v. Moses there was sufficient per-
sonal estate to pay all debts and
legacies-without a sale and, there-
fore, the intention to convert could
not be imputed to the testator,
while in In re Gansert there was
not sufficient personal estate for
the purposes of the will, and the
testator, with knowledge of such
fact, having directed the accom-
plishment of those purposes, must
be considered as having at the same
time directed a sale of his real es-
tate to make up the deficiency, and
thereby worked a conversion out
and out.
A mere power of sale in the ex-
ecutor does not work a constructive
change of the property. The duty
to sell must be imperative: In the
Matter of the Will of Fox, 52 N.Y.,
530- But where a power of sale is
given, and it is apparent from the
general provisions of the will that
the testator intended his real estate
to be sold, the doctrine of equitable
conversion applies: Phelps v. Bond,
23 N. Y., 69.
In the case of Fisher v. Banta, 66
N. Y., 438, the will directed the
executors to divide the real estate
equally between the testator's two
sons, and a codicil directed his ex-
ecutors to sell his real estate. It
was held that the direction to 'sell
was indicative of an intention on
the part of the testator that his
land should be divided between his
two sons as personalty. By this
construction both clauses of the
will were effectively carried out.
Had the first direction been obeyed;
and theland distributed,.the second
direction could not have been of
any effect, for there would have
been no land left to sell, and the
direction would have been nuga-
tory.
If the direction to sell is imper-
ative, requiring a sale at all events,
and leaving it discretionary with
the executors only as to the time
and manner of selling, the conver-
sion will be considered as taking
place at the death of the testator,
and the. sale when made has the
same effect, in respect to the rights
of the parties in interest, as thougli
made immediately: Arnold v. Gil-
bert, 5 Barb., S. Ct., 192.
"Upon the principles of equit-
able conversion," said the chancel-
lor, in Lorillard v. Coster, 5 Paige,
173, "money directed by the testa-
tor to be employed in the purchase
of land, or land directed to be sold
and turned into money is, in this
court, for all the purposes of the
will, considered as that species of
property into which it is directed to
be converted; so far as the purposes
for which such conversion is
directed to be made are legal, and
can be carried into effecL"
The same principle is also appli-
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cable to the case of a direction in
awill to sell one piece of land, and
to convert it into another for the
purposes of the will, by investing
the proceeds of the sale in the pur-
chase of such other lands, under a
valid power of trust, to make such
sale and reinvestment.
The general doctrine as adopted
in New York is vindicated at some
length in Kane v. Gott, 24 Wend.,
641, in which a trust in the execu-
tors was created, with imperative
directions to sell, as soon as may
be, the testator's whole real estate,
and appropriate the avails to the
purposes of the will, in conhection
with his other personal property.
By his own act the testator had the
power to throw the land into this
shape, either by sale before his
death or by his will: Gott v. Cook,
7 Paige Ch., 521; Van Vetchen v.
Van Vetchen, 8 Paige, io6; Stagg
v. Jackson, x Comstock, 2o6.
In Vhite and Tudor's Leading
Cases in Equity, Vol. i, Part ii,
page II59, it is said, "The courts
of Kentucky, though they do not
reject the principle, obviously re-
gard it-with disfavor," and in sup-
port of this the following cases are
cited: Clay v. Hart, 7 Dana, i; and
-Samuel v. Samuel's Administra-
tors, etc., 4 B. Mon., 245.
Clay v. Hart does not support
this statement, as the only point
decided in that case, touching in
any manner upon equitable coffver-
sion, was that where a mere direc-
tion was given to executors to ex-
ercise discretion whether to sell or
not, the power could not be exer-
cised by the survivor of the execu-
tors. As there was no devise to
them of the legal title, nor of any
personal interest, nor any direction
to sell, no equitable conversion was
considered to have been worked.
Indeed the same rule is applied
in Kentucky as in England and
Pennsylvania. The question is,
does the testator direct a sale, and
show an intention that the benefi-
ciaries shall take as legatees and
not as devisee, if so the land is con-
verted as of the death of the testa-
tor. The Court says in this case:
"Had the testator, peremptorily
directed the sale of the land (and
not for a special purpose, that
might fail, or not require the sale
of the whole of it) so that none of
it could in any event go to the
heirs, or devisees, it would have
been treated, in equity, at the in-
stant of his death, as a portion of
his personal estate, and a direct
and unconditional gift. A -testa-
mentary gift to his wife and chil-
dren of the produce of the sale,
might have been considered as a
legacy for the payment of which
the executor was bound by law.
The words of the will in this case
formed no direction of sale, the
title to the land passed, by the will,
to the beneficiaries, with a discre-
tionary power 'in the executor to
sell the land.
Samuel v. Samuel's Administra-
tors, etc., 4 B. Mon., 245, is the
other case cited to show disapproval
of the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion, by the courts of Kentucky.
True it is here said to be extremely
artificial, and that it will not be
applied, by the Chancellor, to
change the quality of property, as
the testator has left it, without a
clear indication manifested to give
it character as money or land.
But this is no more than is said
in many other States; indeed,
everywhere the direction must be
imperativ6 to sell, at all events,
thereby imposing a duty on the
trustee or executor in order to effect
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an equitable conversion. For it is
the duty to convert, and the cer-
tainty that the actual conversion
will take place sooner or later,
which a court of equity construes,
as a conversion from the death of
the testator. Here the testator de-
vised all his estate, real, personal
and mixed to three trustees, with
full power and authority, in their
discretion, to sell and convey any
of his estate, and he directs the
trustees, in finally settling up and
adjusting and paying over the
amount of the proceeds of his
estate, to distribute among three
children all such sums of money as
shall belong to said estate. The
direction is made discretionary in
terms. Though the last clause
might be construed as expressing
an expectation on the part of the
testator that his estate would be all
converted, yet it was not sufficiently
clear to infer from it a direction to
the trustees to sell at all events, and
thereby to work a constructive con-
version.
In the opinion it is said: "It
may have been described as money,
in the residuary clause, not for the
purpose of controlling the discre-
tion of the trustees', nor of indicat-
ing an intention that the legatees
should have nothing but money,
but only because the testator may
have expected, that under the dis-
cretionary power of the trustees,
the estate would be converted into
money. The Court goes on to say:
"And will such an implied expec-
tation, when there is no command
and the distribution of the estate
in kind, to those to whom it is
given would not violate any express
provision of the will, furnish such
evidence of an intention to convert
the whole estate into money, as to
authorize a courtof equity to regard
it as money, before it is actually
converted? The doctrineof equit-
able conversion is at best extremely
artificial. Its basis is that things
agreed to be done are treated,. in
equity, as if actually done, but as
the principle is stated in Story's
Equity, Vol. II, 212 and 214, they
are so treated for "many purposes,"
and, therefore, impliedly, not for
all purposes; and the court does
not interfere to change the quality
of the property as the testator has
left it, unless there be some clear
act or intention by which he has
fixed upon it throughout a definite
character, as money or as land.
Nor will equity consider things as
done in this light in favor of every-
body, but only of those who have a
right to pray that it might be done."
It is said in Powell on "Devi-
ses," at page 63: "The new char-
acter must be decisively and abso-
lutely fixed upon the property."
If trustees may convert it or not as
they see fit, there is no constructive
conversion.
I do not see that such statements
show any obvious disfavor to the
doctrine itself, nor can I find any
expressions in Hite v. Hite, the
case taken for annotation, which is
a decision of a Kentucky court,
showing that equitable conversion
is any more unfavorably received
in Kentucky than in the other
States. Judge HoLT says, in Hite
v. Hite: "The intention of the
testator must govern." He un-
doubtedlyintended that the trustees
should so change and invest the
estate to make all of it productive
of income. This is evident from
the eighth clause of the will which
directs them to invest and dispose
of it, "so as to be safe and produce
income." He must have known
that this could not be done at once,
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without sacrifice. This doubtless
led to his giving them a broad dis-
,retion in the matter. The estate
was large, much of it, at his death,
uas already productive, and it can-
not well be supposed that he ex-
pected a part of the principal would
be given to the life tenants to com-
pensate for a delay which he knew
must occur before the remainder
could be made so. Then. follows
the only clause in the opinion that
could possibly be considered as
throwing disfavor upon the doc-
trine of equitable conversion, which
he had already adopted. The doc-
trine of equitable conversion is at
best, an artificial, arbitrary one.
It will not be applied unless it be
made the duty of the trustees to
sell. The Chief Justice concedes
that the duty to sell is imposed
upon the trustees in this case and
holds that the discretion given, re-
lates only to the time when it shall
be done.
In Christler v. Medis, 6 B. Mon.,
37, and in Hocker v. Gentry, 3
Meb. (Ky.), 473, the doctrine is
stated, that if the direction to sell
is imperative, the right of the
legatee will, in equity, be regarded
as a right to money, from the time
of the testator's death, though the
period of sale is remote, and con-
version cannot be made until the
time arives.
The Court, in the first of the
above cases, said: "Real estate is
converted into personalty, imme-
diately upon the death of the tes-
tator, only where the direction to
sell is positive, without limitation
and without discretion as to time,
on the part of those to whom the
power is delegated."
The statement that the direction
of sale must be without limitation
as to time cannot stand, because it
ik clearly the rule in Kentucky that,
though the time of sale is left to
the discretion of the trustees, yet if
the duty to sell sometime is placed
upon them constructive conversion
will take place.
In Green v. Johnson, 4 Bush.,
164, decided in 1868, the Court
construed the words "authorize
and request" as working a conver-
sion. Judge RoBERTSON says: "If,
instead of devising the title to his
three daughters, and merely re-
questing a sale of the land, the
testator had devised it to the ex-
ecutors, and peremptorily ordered
them to sell; it is admitted that, as
to that interest, it was money be-
queathed, and not land devised.
Nevertheless, if thewill con Fern-
ing the sale must be construed as
mandatory, the testator must be
presumed to have intended a con-
version of the land into money, as
best for the testamentary benefi-
ciaries; and his intention if clearly
manifest for such conversion, made
the land money to the legatees. A
mere authority to sell could not
have been a cohstructive conver-
sion; but the super-added "re-
quest to sell was constructively
mandatory, because the unqualified
request" was the testator's will,
and left no discretion not to sell.
Authority, analogy and reason
allow no escape from this conclu-
sion. Whatever a testator expresses
as his will is mandatory; and if the
will is unqualified the executors
have no right to refuse its fulfill-
ment. Such "request" is synony-
mouswith "require," or "direct,"
or "order." The testator seemed
to think that his provident end, of
the best interest and security of his
daughters, would be most advan-
tageously attained by converting
certain lands into money, and for
EQUITABLE CONVERSION.
that purpose he requested his ex-
ecutors to make the conversion.
This, in equity, was conversion
itself, and, therefore, the daughters
took money instead of land.
A court that will construe "re-
quest" as synonymous with "di-
rect,"in order to hold that an equi-
table conversion has been effected,
can hardly be said to look upon the
doctrine with disfavor. See also
Collins v. Champ's Heirs, 15 B.
Mon., I8.
When land directed to be sold is
devised to certain persons, they
take a gift of 'money; but if they
elect to take the land as land, the
sale need not actually take place,
though the beneficiaries are re-
garded as purchasers. So, if the
testator inserts in his will a clause
giving a legatee the right to elect
to take the land instead of money,
yet as this is giving him no greater
right than the law had. already
given him, such a will is considered
as working a conversion of the land:
Rawlings v. Landis, 2 Bush., i58 ;
Perkins v. Coghlan, z48 Mass., 30;
McFadden v. Hefley, 28 S. C., 317.
King v. King, 13 Rhode Island,
5oi (1882), shows that the courts of
Rhode Island hi.ve adopted the
doctrine in its entirety. The clause
of the will construed in this case
was one by which the testator gave
his executors a general authority
and power of sale of his real estate.
He says: "They may from time to
time, and as often as they deem to
be for the interest of said trust, sell
and convey any of my real estate,
and invest the proceeds. DuR-
FXB, C. J., asks: "What was the
the testator's intention ? The rule
being that, in equity, the property
will be treated as being already
what it was intended that it should
become. Did the testator intend
simply to give the executor or trus-
tee under his will a power to con-
vert, leaving it discretionary with
them to convert or not? If so, the
conversion will depend upon the
will or discretion of the executors
or trustees, and will not be consid-
ered as consummated in law until
it is consummated in fact." In
support of this ,tatement, the'Chief
Justice cites several English cases
and Cook v. Cook, 20 N. J. Eq.,
375; Anewalt's App., 42 Pa., 414;
Chew v. Nicklin, 45 Pa., 84. The
question of the testator's intention
is decided by the rule given, in
Story's Equity, Vol. ii, 214, al-
ready quoted, or as the rule is else-
where laid down: "For the will to
operate as a conversion, it must
show in terms, or by necessary im-
plication, that the testator intended
the property to be converted abso-
lutely, and at all events." The
reason for this rigor of construc
tion is, that there is not a spark of
equity between the next of kin and
the heir, and that therefore neither
ought to lose the right which the
existing character of the property
gives him until it is clearly demon-
strated that the testator intended
to have it changed.
In New Jersey, the case of Cook
v. Cook, 2o N.J.Eq., 375, contains
the rule applicable there. Chan-
cellor ABRAHrAM ;ZABRISKIM, in
construing the following words in
a will: "I do authorize and em-
power my executors to sell and dis-
pose of all my real estate," says:
"When land is directed to be sold,
absolutely and positively, without
any time fixed for sale, it is con-
sidered as converted into money,
from the death of the testator; but
for this, the direction must b 9 im-
perative. If it is optional with the
executor whether to sell or not to
